Over the last decade, there has been a surge of interest in exploring the circumstances that can prompt the activation of stereotypes (for reviews, see Bargh, 1999; Kunda, 1999) . A question of particular importance concerns the likely activation of stereotypes in the course of social interaction: When one interacts with a member of a stereotyped group-an African American, a woman, a professor-is the stereotype of that group likely to be on one's mind? Is a group's stereotype activated spontaneously as soon as one encounters one of its members? And if it is, what happens to its activation as the encounter continues? Does the stereotype remain activated throughout the encounter, or does it subside after a while, as is often the case for primed constructs? Does the extent to which the stereotype is activated in the course of a lengthy interaction depend on the behavior of the stereotyped individual? A great deal of research has examined whether stereotypes are activated upon initial exposure to a stereotyped individual, but practically none has investigated the time course of stereotype activation as the exposure continues. In this article we examine the extent to which applicable stereotypes are on a perceiver's mind at different points during an encounter with a stereotyped individual, and we also explore the consequences for the perceiver's perception of that individual.
It is now clear that stereotypes can be activated spontaneously, as soon as one encounters a member of the stereotyped group.
Even very minimal exposure to members of a stereotyped group can automatically bring to mind the stereotype and attitude associated with that group and can prompt stereotype-consistent behavior. For example, very brief exposure (315 ms) to photographs of Black faces led many White participants to automatically activate negative affect (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995) , and subliminal exposure to photographs of Black faces led nonAfrican Americans to behave aggressively toward a White individual (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997) . Not all people show spontaneous stereotype activation in reaction to stereotypic cues; those who are low in prejudice do not (Kawakami, Dion, & Dovidio, 1998; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997) , those who are high in internal and low in external motivation to respond without prejudice do not (Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2001) , those who are preoccupied with other tasks do not (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998) , and those who are motivated to think highly of a negatively stereotyped individual do not . Nevertheless, the finding that many people do experience automatic stereotype activation upon encountering a stereotyped individual has given rise to much concern because it implies that prejudiced reactions may be uncontrollable and inevitable and that interactions with members of stereotyped groups will be tainted and derailed by the cognitive, affective, and behavioral consequences of the activated stereotypes (Bargh, 1999) .
Such pessimistic conclusions are predicated on the assumption that the stereotype will remain activated throughout the interaction with the stereotyped individual and will exert an ongoing influence on one's thoughts, feelings, and behavior. However, there exists practically no evidence that bears on this crucial assumption. In relevant studies, exposure to stereotyped individuals has typically consisted of photographs of unfamiliar faces flashed for fractions of a second (Bargh et al., 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997; Fazio et al., 1995) . Other relevant studies involved no exposure at all to stereotyped individuals, relying instead on brief exposure to stereotype-related words such as Black (Devine, 1989; Kawakami et al., 1998; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Wittenbrink et al., 1997) . The most extensive exposure in existing research on stereotype activation consisted of brief, soundless videotapes depicting, for example, an Asian experimenter displaying word cards for about 5 min (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991) , a businesswoman working alone in her office for 2 min (Pendry & Macrae, 1996) , or a Chinese woman reading, eating, or applying makeup for 15 s (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995) .
It is interesting to demonstrate, as these studies have, that such minimal exposure can provoke stereotype activation. However, it is not obvious from these studies that stereotypes remain activated throughout a lengthier exposure that conveys richer information about a stereotyped individual or during an interaction with such an individual. Instead, it may be that as one learns more about an individual, the initially activated stereotype recedes and the individual is viewed mostly in terms of what he or she says and does (cf. Brewer, 1988) . The first aim of this article is to examine whether stereotype activation diminishes with time during an encounter with a stereotyped individual. Although there is no evidence that bears directly on this question, several lines of research are relevant.
The assumption that the activation of primed constructs decays with time is central to the most widely accepted models of cognition, spreading activation models (e.g., Anderson, 1983; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986) . Indeed, the effects of semantic priming can be very short lived. Even the mere interposition of several unrelated words between the prime and the target can suffice to eliminate the effects of semantic priming on tasks such as lexical decisions (for a review, see Neely, 1991) . However, the implications of research on the dissipation of semantic priming for the question of whether stereotype activation dissipates in the course of an interaction with a stereotyped individual are not obvious. This is because priming studies have not addressed the impact of primes that remain in the perceiver's view throughout the testing session, focusing instead on the impact of previously presented primes that are no longer present at the time their impact is assessed (for a review, see Neely, 1991) . It is therefore unclear from priming research whether the activation of a stereotype prompted by a stereotyped individual will decay if one remains in the presence of that individual.
Research on stereotype use provides indirect support for the notion that the activation of stereotypes triggered by the initial exposure to a stereotyped individual may subside as the exposure continues. Locksley and her colleagues (Locksley, Borgida, Brekke, & Hepburn, 1980; Locksley, Hepburn, & Ortiz, 1982) demonstrated that although people use group stereotypes in their judgments of an individual who is known to belong to the group if they know nothing else about this individual, they often avoid using the stereotype if they also have individuating information regarding, for example, the individual's behavior or background. Reliance on stereotypes to judge an individual may even be undercut by individuating information that does not bear on stereotypic attributes (e.g., Hilton & Fein, 1989 ; for a review, see Kunda & Thagard, 1996) . Research in this paradigm has examined only stereotype application and has not examined stereotype activation. Yet these findings do suggest that when one obtains individuating information about a person, one views applicable stereotypes as irrelevant to judgments about this person. Indeed, people believe that stereotypes provide a less valid basis for judging a person than does individuating information (Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, & Rocher, 1994) . This view that the stereotype should not figure in one's impressions of an individual who has become somewhat familiar may prompt perceivers to shift their attention from the stereotype to different aspects of the individual or to the task at hand, resulting in dissipation of the initial stereotype activation.
Thus, our prediction that stereotypes activated by an exposure to a member of a stereotyped group may dissipate as the exposure continues and one learns more about this individual seems reasonable in view of relevant research. However, it remains necessary to study this proposition, because there is no direct evidence for it. The present studies aim to do so.
If we are correct in assuming that initially activated stereotypes may recede as one's encounter with the stereotyped individual goes on, may we also conclude that stereotypes are never on one's mind beyond the first few minutes of an interaction with a stereotyped individual? Unfortunately, we have witnessed too much prejudice and discrimination to endorse this rosy possibility. Rather, we suspect that various things can happen during an interaction with a member of a stereotyped group that highlight the individual's membership in that group and thereby bring the group's stereotype back to mind.
One kind of event that might bring a dissipated stereotype back to mind may be the discovery of a disagreement with the stereotyped individual. Disagreement with a member of a different social group may open up a cultural divide between the self and the other (Miller & Prentice, 1999) . As one struggles to understand how this person can hold a view that is so different from one's own, one may focus on the person's otherness as a likely explanation. Different social groups are often assumed to have different inherent essences (Brewer & Harasty, 1996; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Medin, 1989) , and such assumptions may influence the way people explain differences of opinion between members of different groups (Miller & Prentice, 1999) . For example, a man who finds himself disagreeing with a woman may assume that she sees the world differently from the way he does because she is a different kind of person, namely, a woman. This categorization of the person as a woman may prompt the activation of the stereotype of women. More generally, disagreement with a member of an out-group may highlight that individual's group membership and thereby cause one to activate the stereotype of the out-group. Disagreement may also prompt stereotype activation because it may provoke a motivation to discredit the person who has challenged one's beliefs so as to dispel the threat to one's worldview. Negative stereotypes may be activated when one is so motivated, because they can provide a justification for disparaging the stereotyped individual . Such self-protective motives have been shown to trigger stereotype activation even in circumstances in which the stereotype would otherwise not be activated (Spencer et al., 1998) . Finally, disagreement with a stereotyped individual may provoke anger, which, in turn, could prompt stereotype activation (Bodenhausen, 1993) . For all these reasons, we predicted that an initially activated stereotype that has already dissipated may become reactivated during an encounter with a stereotyped individual upon the discovery of a disagreement with this individual. The second aim of this article is to examine this possibility.
We expect that when a stereotype becomes activated in the course of one's interaction with a stereotyped individual, one will be more likely to view this individual through the lenses of the stereotype. However, only a handful of studies have assessed both the activation and the application of stereotypes in the same participants, and these have found that, under normal circumstances, perceivers who activate stereotypes when exposed to a stereotyped individual often fail to apply their activated stereotypes to this individual (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; . Most likely, perceivers avoid applying activated stereotypes because they are motivated to avoid being or appearing prejudiced (Fazio et al., 1995; Plant & Devine, 1998) . Indeed, perceivers who normally avoid applying their activated stereotypes do apply them in situations that also include factors that undercut their ability to engage in the effortful suppression of stereotyping, such as cognitive busyness (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991) , or factors that can override their motivation to avoid prejudice, such as the motivation to disparage the stereotyped individual . Therefore, to detect the application of activated stereotypes, it may be necessary to turn to implicit measures of stereotyping that are less likely to be influenced by participants' motivation to avoid prejudice (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) . Our final aim is to examine this possibility.
In sum, we aim to explore the dynamic time course of stereotype activation. Our first hypothesis was that stereotypes that had been activated upon initial exposure to a stereotyped individual would recede as the exposure continued and would no longer be activated following prolonged exposure. Studies 1-3 examine this possibility. Our second hypothesis was that stereotypes that had dissipated following a prolonged exposure to a stereotyped individual would become reactivated upon the discovery of a disagreement with this individual. Studies 2 and 3 examine this possibility. We also examined the implications of a disagreement that prompted stereotype activation for perceivers' perceptions of the stereotyped individual, using explicit measures of stereotype application (Study 3) and implicit measures (Study 4).
Study 1
Several studies have shown that very brief exposure to videotapes or photographs of Black or Asian individuals can prompt the spontaneous activation of these groups' stereotypes (Bargh et al., 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae et al., 1995; Pendry & Macrae, 1996) . We therefore expected that a brief exposure to a videotape depicting a Black individual would prompt the activation of the stereotype of Black people in Canada. We also expected that this stereotype activation would dissipate following continued exposure to that individual.
Participants viewed a videotape of either a Black or a White female student describing campus life. The videotape was paused to allow participants to complete a measure of their activation of the stereotype of Black people either after a very brief exposure to the target individual (15 s) or after a more prolonged exposure (12 min). This 12-min duration is substantially longer than that used in any previous studies on stereotype activation and approximates the length of many casual, everyday interactions. We predicted that such exposure would be long enough to permit the dissipation of an initially activated stereotype. Therefore, we expected that participants who had been exposed to the Black individual would show increased activation of the Black stereotype after the brief exposure but not after the prolonged one.
Method Participants
Participants were 75 male and female non-Black students enrolled in an introductory psychology class at the University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, who participated for course credit. Participants' gender had no impact on the dependent measures in this and the following studies, so we do not discuss it further. Two participants were excluded from the analyses for disbelieving the cover story, and 2 were excluded because of equipment malfunction, leaving a total of 71 participants.
Procedure
Participants took part individually in sessions conducted by a White female experimenter. They read that the study was part of a program designed to develop an intervention to help people experiencing life transitions. A local mental health council had already conducted interviews with people who had undergone various life transitions. We informed participants that they would be asked to evaluate the effectiveness of one of these interviews, which concerned a transition that they had experienced, starting university. Their task was to view a videotaped interview and then to indicate how helpful they thought it would be to a student about to start university.
Participants were also informed that the videotape would be interrupted at predetermined points for an assessment of their cognitive engagementthat is, the extent to which the interview captured their attention. In fact, this was a lexical decision task assessing stereotype activation. All participants completed a practice trial of the lexical decision task so as to familiarize themselves with it. The 20 words used in the practice trial were all unrelated to the Black stereotype.
Participants then began viewing the videotaped interview, which depicted either a Black or a White actress, both of whom had been trained to deliver the same script in the same manner. The script revealed little personal, stereotype-related information about the speaker. It focused on issues that students face when they first arrive on campus, such as registration, scheduling classes, and buying books. Words describing each topic (e.g., registration, scheduling courses) were spliced into the videotape, and each such title was followed by the interviewee's discussion of it. The script was based on pretests in which 1st-year students described their relevant experiences, and it covered commonly mentioned issues. For example, the interviewee's description of registration procedures began with Well, the first day you come to campus, it's pretty busy. Registration is probably the first thing to get done. I mean, you get the stuff you need in the mail so it's probably a good idea to read through that before the first day and to know a bit about where you're going. Everybody does it differently, but it's probably best to get registered before all the other stuff you have to do, like books and stuff. You have to make sure that you bring the forms with you, I mean the ones that were mailed to you, or it's a lot harder.
Participants were interrupted for a cognitive engagement assessment (in fact, an assessment of stereotype activation) either 15 s or 12 min into the interview. When this happened, the videotape was paused, and participants were seated in front of a computer in an adjacent room.
Assessing stereotype activation. The lexical decision task required participants to indicate whether each of a series of letter strings was a word or a nonword by pressing an appropriate key. They were encouraged to respond quickly and accurately. The task was conducted on a Macintosh IIfx computer programmed with SuperLab software (Abboud, 1996) . The stimuli were presented in the center of the screen as black words on a white background. Each letter string remained on the screen until the participant responded. The next letter string was presented following a 1,000-ms pause.
The list of letter strings included 56 words and 56 nonwords whose presentation was randomized for each participant. Six of the words were related to the stereotype of Black people in Canada (i.e., poor, athletic, crime, sex, rhythm, color) . These words were selected because they were frequently mentioned in a pretest asking participants to report on the culturally held stereotype of Black people in Canada and were used in other studies assessing the activation of the Black stereotype (e.g., Steele & Aronson, 1995) . Each stereotypic word was matched by a neutral word of similar length and frequency (i.e., unit, abruptly, post, weekly, clerk, gray) , on the basis of norms reported by Kucera and Francis (1967) .
Design. In sum, the experiment had a 2 (target race: Black or White) ϫ 2 (exposure time: brief or prolonged) ϫ 2 (word type: stereotypic or neutral) mixed-model design, with the first two variables varied between participants and the third varied within participants.
Results and Discussion
Trials on which the participant responded incorrectly or after the 2,000-ms time limit were excluded (3.1%). Trials on which the response time to a word exceeded 2.36 standard deviations from that word's mean were considered outliers and were excluded from the analyses (3.5%; this standard for outliers was based on tables provided by Van Selst & Jolicouer, 1994) .
1 Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) revealed that there were no differences among conditions in numbers of errors or outliers, all Fs Ͻ 1.
Reaction times to the words pertaining to the Black stereotype were averaged into a measure of stereotype activation (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .63), as were reaction times to the neutral words. As may be seen in Figure 1 , participants exposed to the Black target showed greater activation of the Black stereotypic words than did participants exposed to the White target following a brief exposure to the target but not following a prolonged exposure. Reaction times to the neutral words did not show this pattern. These data were analyzed with a 2 (target race) ϫ 2 (exposure time) ϫ 2 (word type) mixed-model ANOVA, yielding a marginally significant three-way interaction, F(1, 67) ϭ 3.29, p ϭ .07. Contrasts revealed that the 2 (target race) ϫ 2 (exposure time) interaction was significant for the stereotypic words, F(1, 67) ϭ 4.43, p Ͻ .05, but not for the neutral words, F(1, 67) ϭ 0.61. Moreover, a 2 (target race) ϫ 2 (exposure time) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on the stereotypic words, in which the neutral words served as a covariate to adjust for individual differences in reaction time, obtained a significant interaction, F(1, 66) ϭ 4.70, p Ͻ .05.
We expected that the Black stereotype would be activated only for participants exposed briefly to the Black target. Therefore, we expected these participants to be faster than participants in the remaining three conditions to identify the stereotypic words but did not expect them to show increased speed on the neutral words. To provide a more precise test of these predictions, we conducted planned comparisons within each word type that pitted the Black brief exposure condition against the other three (i.e., the Black brief exposure cell was given the weight of Ϫ3, and the three remaining cells were each given the weight of ϩ1). This contrast was significant for the stereotypic words, F(1, 67) ϭ 5.86, p Ͻ .05, but not for the neutral words, p Ͼ .50.
As may be seen in Figure 1 , following the brief, 15-s exposure to the target, participants exposed to the Black target showed stereotype activation-they were faster than were participants exposed briefly to the White target to identify the stereotypic words, F(1, 67) ϭ 3.73, p ϭ .05. This result is consistent with the well-documented finding that a brief exposure to a stereotyped individual can prompt spontaneous stereotype activation (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae et al., 1995) . In marked contrast, participants exposed to the Black target for the more prolonged duration of 12 min showed no evidence of stereotype activationthe speed with which they identified the stereotypic words did not differ from that of participants who had experienced prolonged exposure to the White target, p Ͼ .20. Participants who had undergone prolonged exposure to the Black target also showed less stereotype activation than did participants who had undergone only brief exposure to that target, F(1, 67) ϭ 7.79, p Ͻ .01. The comparable contrast for participants exposed to the White target did not approach significance, p Ͼ .50. None of the comparable contrasts for the neutral words reached significance.
In sum, the Black stereotype was activated spontaneously upon initial exposure to the Black individual, but this activation was short lived. It was no longer evident by the end of an additional 12 min of exposure. The initially activated stereotype had dissipated over time. We note briefly that this finding has proven to be robust. The same pattern was obtained in a second study using the same design, in which participants heard an audiotape of a man delivering a similar script while they viewed a large slide depicting the face of the alleged speaker, a young man who was either Black or White (Adams & Kunda, 1995) . Once again, participants showed activation of the Black stereotype after a brief exposure to the Black man but not after a lengthy exposure to him. And no comparable pattern was obtained for neutral words. When we combined the results of this replication study with those obtained in Study 1 using meta-analytic procedures (Rosenthal, 1991) , the Figure 1 . Reaction times (Study 1) to Black stereotypic words and to neutral words given by participants exposed to a Black or a White target for a brief duration (15 s) or for a prolonged duration (12 min). obtained 2 (target race) ϫ 2 (exposure time) ϫ 2 (word type) interaction was significant, z ϭ 2.21, p Ͻ .05.
Study 2
The results of Study 1 should seem encouraging to anyone concerned about the insidious effects of stereotype activation on thoughts, feelings, and behavior during everyday interactions. True, stereotypes can be activated spontaneously by a brief exposure to a stereotyped individual (cf. Bargh et al., 1996; Fazio et al., 1995; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae et al., 1995) . But the implications to everyday interaction may be less dire than has often been assumed (e.g., Bargh, 1999) , because such spontaneous stereotype activation may be quite short lived. Stereotypes that come to mind when one first encounters a Black individual may fade into the background as the encounter continues, and may cease to exert their insidious influences on judgment and behavior within less than 15 min of interaction.
Unfortunately, it may not take much for a dissipated stereotype to become reactivated while one is observing or interacting with a stereotyped individual. Because stereotypes can be used to explain another's behavior and to justify desired impressions of the other, they may be called upon for these purposes whenever such comprehension and self-enhancement goals are triggered by something that happens during the interaction Spencer et al., 1998) . The discovery of a puzzling disagreement may prompt the need to comprehend the other person's reactions and to bolster the superiority of one's own judgment. Applicable stereotypes may be activated for these purposes. Study 2 examines this possibility.
Because there is already ample evidence that stereotypes may become activated upon initial exposure to a stereotyped individual, Study 2 assesses the activation of stereotypes only after a prolonged exposure to such an individual. In a study that was allegedly about jury decision making, participants first read about a criminal case and indicated their own verdict (we manipulated their verdicts by using two slightly different versions of the case, one that prompted guilty verdicts and one that prompted not-guilty verdicts). Participants then watched a videotape of either a Black or a White young man, supposedly another participant in the jury study, being interviewed about topics unrelated to the court case for about 12 min. At the end of the interview, the target was asked about his verdict, and he reported either a guilty or a not-guilty verdict. Thus, participants discovered that they either agreed or disagreed with a Black or a White individual about the verdict. Their activation of the Black stereotype was then assessed.
On the basis of Study 1, we predicted that participants who discovered that the Black person agreed with them would show no evidence of stereotype activation. They would have observed this individual for long enough to allow for initially activated stereotypes to dissipate and would have little reason to reactivate the stereotype. In contrast, we expected that participants who discovered that the Black person disagreed with them would show stereotype activation.
Method Participants
Participants were 62 male and female non-Black students enrolled in an introductory psychology class at the University of Waterloo who participated for course credit. One participant was excluded for disbelieving the cover story, 1 for refusing to indicate a verdict, and 2 for failing to reach the verdict expected in their conditions, leaving a total of 58 participants.
Procedure
Participants took part individually in sessions conducted by a White female experimenter. They read that the study was designed to simulate the experiences of jurors, who spend a great deal of time together outside the courtroom when they are sequestered and who endure constant interruptions to the court case. To simulate these aspects of jurors' experience, they would first read a transcript of a court case and choose a verdict. They would then be interrupted by a lexical decision task that was unrelated to the court case. Next, they would watch a video of a previous participant having the kind of get-acquainted conversation that sequestered jurors may have. They would then be interrupted again by another lexical decision task. This second lexical decision task was in fact a measure of their activation of the Black stereotype, whereas the first one was a practice trial that contained only stereotype-unrelated words and nonwords.
The court case. Participants read a brief summary of an embezzlement case (based on a case described by Pennington & Hastie, 1992) . There were two versions of the case, one shown in pretests to elicit almost uniform guilty verdicts, and one shown to elicit almost uniform not-guilty verdicts. Both versions concerned a bank guard, Leonard Graves, who was charged with the embezzlement of $6,500 from the vault of a bank he was guarding. Both versions included the information that a janitor at the bank reported seeing Graves place money into a bank money bag at 5:00 PM on the day in question and that the police found $4,000 in a shoe box beneath the floor in Graves' apartment. But the two versions differed in some details of the case. For example, the guilty version noted that Graves had been served with a repossession notice for not making payments on a $2,000 loan, but that he paid off the entire loan in cash the day after the crime and that he appeared to have lied about his whereabouts at the time of the crime. The not-guilty version noted, instead, that the janitor had previously lodged several groundless complaints against Graves, that a barber testified that Graves was getting a haircut at the time of the crime, that Graves testified that he kept his money in cash because he never trusted banks, and that a subsequent investigation revealed that he did not have an active bank account. The experimenter was unaware of which version the participant received.
After reading the transcript of the court case, participants indicated their verdict on an 11-point scale with endpoints labeled Ϫ5 (definitely not guilty) and 5 (definitely guilty).
The interview video. To bolster the cover story, we asked participants to choose 1 of 12 videotapes of different get-acquainted conversations with the 12 members of the simulated jury. In fact, participants were randomly assigned to watch an interview with a Black or a White young man that ended with the man reporting either a guilty or a not-guilty verdict. Both targets had been trained to deliver the identical script in a comparable manner, in reaction to questions posed by an off-screen male interviewer. Before they watched the interview, participants were taken to an adjoining room for the distracter task (the practice trials for the lexical decision task). Meanwhile, the experimenter inserted a predetermined video (identified only by a number) into the VCR. When the participant returned, the experimenter turned on the VCR and left the room before the start of the videotaped interview. Thus, she was unaware of the target's race and verdict.
At the start of the interview, the interviewer mentioned that his younger brother was thinking of attending Waterloo and began asking the target, a Waterloo student, about various aspects of student life there. The interview touched on topics such as course selection, social life, living arrangements, and entertainment options. The target mostly provided information about student life but occasionally described his own reactions. For example, when asked whether he had found it difficult to meet people initially, he responded, Well, in the first week you arrive on campus they have this big social event called Frosh Week. Some of the stuff they get you to do is idiotic, but overall it's pretty fun and it really is a good way to meet new people. Otherwise, some people find it quite hard to meet new people in the first year, like in classes and everything. I guess it's just because everyone is nervous, and it takes a while till people start getting comfortable. A lot of people say the first year is kind of lonely. But even once you do make friends, it's sometimes hard to stay in touch, when each new term you are in different classes and everything. But you usually manage each year to make at least one or two good friends, and then you have other people like roommates who you might go out with once in a while.
After 12 min of discussing topics that were irrelevant to the court case, the interviewee was asked to describe the basics of the case. There were two versions of his response, one in which he reported a guilty verdict, and one in which he reported a not-guilty verdict. The script for the guilty verdict was as follows:
All right, well, it was this embezzlement case about this guy named Graves that was obviously guilty. This guy Graves worked in a bank's vault, and the janitor says he sees him put the money into a money bag. The cops find a money bag and a bunch of money in Grave's apartment. The guy's guilty.
The not-guilty version was modified so that the opening sentence declared that Graves was "obviously not guilty," and the final sentence reiterating the man's guilt was replaced with, "But there's no way you can convict a guy with so little hard evidence, there's definitely a reasonable doubt." At this point the experimenter returned and explained that it was time for an interruption with another distracter task-in fact, a lexical decision task assessing stereotype activation.
The lexical decision task. The lexical decision task was conducted on an IBM-compatible computer using Micro-Experimental Laboratory Professional software (Schneider, 1995) . Stimuli were presented in the center of the screen as white words on a black background. Each trial began with an orienting stimulus (a ϩ sign) that was presented for 500 ms, followed by a letter string that remained on the screen until the participant responded or 2,000 ms had elapsed. The list of letter strings included 48 words and 48 nonwords. Of the words, 17 related to the Black stereotype, 17 were neutral words that matched the stereotypic ones in frequency (Kucera & Francis, 1967) , and the rest were filler words. Order of word presentation was randomized for each participant, with the constraint that there be at least 3 stereotype-unrelated letter strings between the presentation of any two stereotypic words. Participants were instructed to respond quickly and accurately.
To increase the reliability of the stereotype activation measure, we added 11 stereotypic words to the 6 used in Study 1, on the basis of previous research on the Black stereotype (Devine, 1989; Devine & Baker, 1991; Wittenbrink et al., 1997) . The stereotypic words used in this study were race, color, athletic, basketball, rap, crime, dangerous, aggressive, rhythm, ignorant, uneducated, sexual, dealer, jazz, poor, stupid, drugs. The neutral words were ready, sour, jeans, staging, conscious, illustrate, basis, clerk, poet, abruptly, parade, weekly, literalism, unique, integral, soap, horizontal. Manipulation check. After completing the lexical decision task, participants were asked to report the target's verdict on the same scale they had used to indicate their own verdict.
Design. The experiment had a 2 (target race: Black or White) ϫ 2 (participant's verdict: guilty or not guilty) ϫ 2 (target's verdict: guilty or not guilty) ϫ 2 (word type: stereotypic or neutral) mixed-model design; the first three factors varied between participants, and the fourth varied within participants. A 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 ANOVA revealed that the impact of agreement did not depend on which verdicts were reached by the target and the participant in this and the following study. Therefore, the two factors reflecting the target's verdict and the participant's verdict were collapsed into a single factor reflecting the agreement between the participant and the target, with agree representing those conditions in which the participant and the target both found the accused guilty and those conditions in which both found him innocent and disagree representing conditions in which the two reached opposite verdicts. This yielded a 2 (target race: Black or White) ϫ 2 (agreement: agree or disagree) ϫ 2 (word type: stereotypic or neutral) design.
Results and Discussion

Verdicts
Participants assigned to the guilty version of the embezzlement case viewed the accused as guilty (M ϭ 3.68), whereas those assigned to the not-guilty version viewed him as not guilty (M ϭ Ϫ3.29). A 2 (participant's verdict) ϫ 2 (target verdict) ϫ 2 (target race) ANOVA revealed that this effect of participants' assigned verdict was highly significant F(1, 54) ϭ 625.50, p Ͻ .0001. The main effect for target's verdict and the interactions did not approach significance, all Fs Ͻ 1. Clearly, the manipulation of participants' verdict was highly effective.
All participants recalled the target's verdict accurately, with those who viewed him expressing a guilty verdict reporting that he found the accused guilty (M ϭ 4.87) and those who viewed him expressing a not-guilty verdict reporting that he found the accused not guilty (M ϭ Ϫ4.59). A 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 ANOVA revealed this effect of the target's verdict to be highly significant, F(1, 58) ϭ 3,065.37, p Ͻ .0001. The ANOVA also obtained a marginally significant Participant Verdict ϫ Target Verdict interaction, F(1, 58) ϭ 3.74, p Ͻ .06, a significant Target Verdict ϫ Target Race interaction, F(1, 58) ϭ 4.51, p Ͻ .05, and a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 58) ϭ 5.25, p Ͻ .05. These interactions were all due to one of the target-not-guilty cells (for Black target, participant guilty) being somewhat less extreme (M ϭ Ϫ3.90) than the remaining target-not-guilty cells (Ms ϭ Ϫ4.80, Ϫ4.90, and Ϫ4.90). There were no differences among the four target-guilty cells (Ms ϭ 4.60, 5.00, 5.00, and 4.90). As is clear from these extreme means (on a scale whose endpoints were Ϫ5 and 5), there was little or no variance in most cells, and this lack of variance contributed to the unexpected significance of the two-and three-way interactions. Despite these interactions, it is clear that the manipulation of the target's verdict was highly effective; even participants in the least extreme cell correctly identified the target's verdict and rated it as quite extreme.
Stereotype Activation
As in Study 1, trials on which the participant responded incorrectly or after 2,000 ms were excluded (4%). Trials on which the response time exceeded 2.36 standard deviations from the word's mean were considered outliers and were excluded (2.4%). There were no differences among conditions in numbers of errors or outliers, all Fs Ͻ 1.
Internal analyses revealed that responses to 2 of the words pertaining to the Black stereotype, aggressive and jazz, were uncorrelated with responses to the remaining words. The itemtotal correlations for these words were, respectively, .09 and .11 (the average correlation of the remaining words was .57, and the next lowest correlation was .23). These 2 words were therefore excluded. Reaction times to the remaining 15 stereotypic words were averaged into a measure of stereotype activation (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .88), as were reaction times to their matched neutral words.
As may be seen in Figure 2 , participants exposed to the Black target showed greater activation of the Black stereotypic words than did participants exposed to the White target following a disagreement with the target but not following an agreement. The pattern for the neutral words was similar but much weaker. A 2 (target race) ϫ 2 (agreement) ϫ 2 (word type) mixed-model ANOVA yielded a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 55) ϭ 4.00, p ϭ .05, indicating that the pattern obtained for stereotypic words differed from that obtained for neutral words. The 2 (target race) ϫ 2 (agreement) interaction was significant for stereotypic words, F(1, 55) ϭ 5.74, p Ͻ .05, but not for neutral words, p Ͼ .25. Moreover, when we controlled for the neutral words by conducting a 2 (target race) ϫ 2 (agreement) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on the stereotypic words in which neutral words served as a covariate, the interaction remained significant, F(1, 54) ϭ 6.55, p ϭ .01.
We expected the Black stereotype to be activated only for participants who had disagreed with the Black target. Therefore, we expected these participants to be faster than participants in the remaining three conditions to identify the stereotypic words but did not expect them to be faster on the neutral words. To provide a more precise test of these predictions, we conducted planned comparisons within each word type that pitted the Black brief exposure condition against the other three conditions (the Black disagree cell was given the weight of Ϫ3, and the three remaining cells were each given the weight of ϩ1). This contrast was significant for the stereotypic words, F(1, 55) ϭ 5.61, p Ͻ .05, but not for the neutral words, p Ͼ .20.
Recall that participants in this study were all exposed to the target for a duration-12 min-shown in Study 1 to be long enough to permit the dissipation of initially activated stereotypes. Indeed, as seen in Figure 2 , participants who had agreed with the Black target showed no evidence of stereotype activation-their reaction times to stereotypic words did not differ from those of participants who had agreed with the White target, F(1, 55) ϭ 0.82, p Ͼ .30. In marked contrast, participants who had disagreed with the Black target did show stereotype activationthey were faster to identify the stereotypic words than were participants who had disagreed with a White person, F(1, 55) ϭ 4.40, p Ͻ .05. Participants who had disagreed with the Black target also showed greater stereotype activation than did participants who had agreed with the same Black target, F(1, 55) ϭ 6.21, p Ͻ .05. None of the comparable contrasts for the neutral words reached significance.
In sum, the Black stereotype was activated for participants who had disagreed with the Black person but not for participants who had agreed with him. We believe that this pattern was obtained because the disagreement with the Black person triggered the activation of a stereotype that would have otherwise not been activated at that point. However, it might be argued that this pattern occurred, instead, because the agreement with the Black person led participants to suppress the activation of the Black stereotype (which would have otherwise been activated), perhaps because it motivated them to view the person who had agreed with them in nonstereotypic terms (cf. . We consider this possibility unlikely for two reasons. First, even without discovering an agreement, Study 1 participants who had been exposed to a Black person for a comparable duration showed no stereotype activation. This finding has proven to be quite robust; a similar lack of stereotype activation following a 10 -15-min exposure to a Black or Asian individual has since been obtained in several other studies (Kunda, Davies, HoshinoBrowne, & Jordan, in press ). It is difficult to argue that the discovery of an agreement with a Black individual prompted the inhibition of a stereotype that would have otherwise been activated, because there is strong reason to believe that the stereotype would not otherwise have been activated at that point. Second, the level of stereotype activation obtained in previous studies for participants showing motivated inhibition of stereotype activation was lower than that obtained for controls who had been exposed to White individuals ). In contrast, the level of stereotype activation for participants who had agreed with the Black individual in this study was comparable to rather than lower than that obtained for participants who had agreed with the White individual. This pattern does not permit a clear inference of inhibition and is more consistent with lack of activation.
Most likely, then, this study suggests that the discovery that one disagrees with a Black person can suffice to bring the Black stereotype to mind, even if this stereotype has already receded over the course of a lengthy exposure to this person.
Study 3
Studies 1 and 2 imply that stereotypes can be activated spontaneously when one encounters a stereotyped individual, can dissipate as the encounter continues, and can reemerge upon the discovery of a disagreement with the stereotyped individual. In Study 3 we aimed to replicate the finding that a disagreement with a stereotyped individual can prompt stereotype activation, and also aimed to examine the consequences of such activation for participants' impressions of this individual. It has been shown that factors that prompt perceivers to activate the African American stereotype can influence the perceivers' reactions to subsequently encountered individuals. Priming with words related to this stereotype has led participants to rate ambiguously described indi- Figure 2 . Reaction times to Black stereotypic words and to neutral words given by participants who had either agreed or disagreed on the verdict in a court case with a target who was either Black or White (Study 2). viduals as more hostile and aggressive (Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997) , and priming with Black faces has led participants to behave more aggressively toward a newly encountered individual (Chen & Bargh, 1997) . There is therefore reason to believe that when participants' stereotype of Black people is activated by the discovery of a disagreement with a Black individual, this leads them to view this individual's subsequent behavior through the lenses of the stereotype.
It is important to note, however, that in all studies in which priming with cues related to the Black stereotype influenced reactions to subsequently encountered individuals, these individuals were known or assumed to be White (Chen & Bargh, 1997; Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997) . It is not obvious that these findings generalize to perceptions of non-White individuals because people who are confronted with a member of an ethnic minority may be reluctant to entertain or to express stereotypic impressions for fear of being or appearing prejudiced (Fazio et al., 1995; Plant & Devine, 1998) . Indeed, there are two studies in which participants exposed to a videotape of an Asian or a Black person activated the relevant group's stereotype but refrained from applying it to that person (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991 , Experiment 2, never busy participants; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999, Experiment 2) . This may have occurred because participants were motivated to avoid prejudice. It is also possible, however, that those participants did not apply activated stereotypes to the stereotyped individual because they had not observed ambiguous information about this individual whose construal could be influenced by the relevant stereotypes (Darley & Gross, 1983; Kunda & Sherman-Williams, 1993) .
To examine whether the stereotypes activated by a disagreement with a Black person also influenced participants' impressions of this person, we modified Study 2's procedure by adding ambiguous information about the target that could be, but did not have to be, construed as indicative of aggressiveness and of low intelligence, attributes associated with the stereotype of Black people. After discovering, as in Study 2, that they either agreed or disagreed with a Black or White individual, participants completed a measure of their activation of the Black stereotype and then read the additional ambiguously stereotypic information about the target individual and rated him on stereotypic traits.
We expected that, as in Study 2, participants who were exposed to the Black target would activate the Black stereotype following a disagreement with him but not following an agreement. We entertained competing hypotheses about whether these participants would also apply their activated stereotype to the Black target. In the earlier studies (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; , participants who had activated stereotypes when exposed to a stereotyped individual did not apply the stereotypes to that individual. If this pattern occurred because those participants had not observed ambiguously stereotypic information about the target, then in this study, which did provide participants with such information, participants for whom the Black stereotype was activated by a disagreement with the Black target should also rate this target as especially aggressive and unintelligent. However, if participants in the earlier studies refrained from applying their activated stereotypes because they were motivated to avoid prejudice, the same concerns should prevent stereotype application in this study as well.
Method Participants
Participants were 61 male and female non-Black students enrolled in an introductory psychology class at the University of Waterloo who participated for course credit. One participant was excluded for failing to reach the appropriate verdict, leaving a total of 60 participants.
Procedure
Participants read about a court case, gave their verdict, and then observed a videotape of a Black or White fellow juror who discussed mundane issues for 12 min before indicating his verdict, which either agreed or disagreed with the participant's. Participants then completed a lexical decision task assessing stereotype activation. Up to this point, the procedure was identical to that of Study 2. Participants next read a paragraph that was said to be a transcript of the target's description of his experience in the deliberation portion of the study. This transcript contained statements that could be interpreted as indicative of the target's aggressiveness and low intelligence but could also be interpreted as provoked by the other jurors' behavior rather than by the target's dispositions. For example, in an ambiguously hostile section, the target described a juror who "loves to hear himself talk. He just kept blabbering on and on, I actually got so frustrated I had to tell him to be quiet a couple of times." And in an ambiguously unintelligent section, the target described a juror who "was so arrogant, half the time I didn't even know what this guy was talking about. . . . He kept using big words and making obscure references to philosophers and stuff."
Next, participants rated the target on 10 traits associated with aggression and intelligence (aggressive, hostile, short-tempered, rude, considerate, kind, intelligent, reasonable, thoughtful, ignorant). These were embedded among 12 stereotype-unrelated traits (e.g., fair minded, boring). Ratings were made on 7-point scales with endpoints labeled 1 (not at all) and 7 (very).
Results and Discussion
Verdicts
Participants assigned to the guilty version of the case viewed the accused as guilty (M ϭ 3.79), whereas those assigned to the not-guilty version viewed him as not guilty (M ϭ Ϫ3.10). A 2 (participant's verdict) ϫ 2 (target verdict) ϫ 2 (target race) ANOVA revealed this effect to be highly significant F(1, 52) ϭ 381.43, p Ͻ .0001. The main effect for target's verdict and the interactions did not approach significance, all Fs Ͻ 1.
Stereotype Activation
As in Studies 1 and 2, trials on which the participant responded incorrectly or after 2,000 ms were excluded (4.6%). Trials on which the response time exceeded 2.36 standard deviations from the word's mean were excluded as outliers (3.7%). There were no differences among conditions in numbers of errors or outliers, all Fs Ͻ 1.
Internal analyses revealed that responses to two of the Blackstereotypic words, poor and drugs, were uncorrelated with responses to the remaining words. The item-total correlations for these words were, respectively, .00 and .06 (the average correlation for the remaining words was .57, and the next lowest corre-lation was .23).
2 These two words were therefore excluded from the analyses. Reaction times to the remaining stereotypic words were averaged into a measure of stereotype activation (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .86), as were reaction times to their matched neutral words.
As may be seen in Figure 3 , participants exposed to the Black target showed greater activation of the Black stereotypic words than did participants exposed to the White target following a disagreement with the target but not following an agreement. No such pattern emerged for the neutral words. A 2 (target race) ϫ 2 (agreement) ϫ 2 (word type) mixed-model ANOVA yielded a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 56) ϭ 3.91, p ϭ .05, indicating that the pattern obtained for stereotypic words differed from that obtained for neutral words. The 2 (target race) ϫ 2 (agreement) interaction was not significant for the stereotypic words, F(1, 56) ϭ 1.64, p ϭ .20, or for the neutral words, p Ͼ .50. However, when we controlled for the neutral words by conducting a 2 (target race) ϫ 2 (agreement) ANCOVA on the stereotypic words in which neutral words served as a covariate, the interaction was significant, F(1, 55) ϭ 5.50, p Ͻ .05.
Follow-up analyses of stereotypic words revealed that the planned contrast pitting participants who had disagreed with the Black target against participants in the remaining three conditions was also significant, F(1, 56) ϭ 3.91, p Ͻ .05. As may be seen in Figure 3 , the obtained pattern of results replicates Study 2. Once again, participants who had agreed with the Black individual showed no evidence of stereotype activation-their reaction times to stereotypic words did not differ from those of participants who had agreed with the White individual, F(1, 56) Ͻ 1. In marked contrast, participants who had disagreed with the Black individual did show stereotype activation-they were faster to identify the stereotypic words than were participants who had disagreed with the White individual, F(1, 56) ϭ 4.05, p Ͻ .05. None of the comparable contrasts for the neutral words reached significance.
It appears, once again, that the discovery of a disagreement with a Black individual can suffice to bring to mind a stereotype that would otherwise have remained dormant.
Stereotype Application
We averaged ratings of the target on the stereotypic traits into a measure of stereotypicality, after first reversing counterstereotypic items (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .88). A 2 (target race) ϫ 2 (agreement) ANOVA yielded no significant effects, all ps Ͼ .20. Mean stereotypicality ratings in the Black disagree, White disagree, Black agree, and White agree conditions were, respectively, 3.93, 4.37, 4.27, and 4.39. Thus, participants who had disagreed with the Black target, and who had consequently activated the Black stereotype, did not apply this stereotype to this Black individual. If anything, they tended to rate the target as less stereotypic than did participants in other conditions, but the contrast pitting the Black disagree condition against the other three conditions did not reach significance, F(1, 56) ϭ 2.39, p Ͻ .13.
These results help clarify previous studies in which participants activated an applicable stereotype when exposed to a stereotyped person but did not apply it to that person (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; . We have suggested that this may have occurred because participants in those studies did not have ambiguously stereotypic information about the target. But participants in this study did have such ambiguous information and still refrained from applying their activated Black stereotype to the Black individual who had prompted its activation. Study 4 explores alternative reasons for this lack of stereotype application.
Study 4
In Study 3, participants who had disagreed with a Black individual activated the Black stereotype but did not apply it to their ratings of his attributes. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that these participants may have, in fact, viewed the Black individual in stereotypic terms following their disagreement with him. It is possible that these participants did form stereotypic impressions of that individual but did not disclose these impressions in their ratings because they were motivated to avoid prejudice. The motivation to avoid prejudice can reduce people's willingness to express their felt negativity toward stereotyped groups (Fazio et al., 1995; Plant & Devine, 1998) and may also lead people to avoid expressing stereotypic impressions of individuals if they believe that such expressions might be considered prejudiced (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) . The explicit measure of stereotype application used in Study 3, rating the target on stereotypic traits, may have made it obvious to participants that their responses might reveal their use of stereotypes, and this may have led the participants to strategically tailor their responses so as to prevent the appearance of inappropriate stereotyping.
It is also possible that participants who activated the stereotype after disagreeing with the Black person formed an implicit stereotypic impression of that person while explicitly viewing him as no different from his White counterpart; people sometimes entertain implicit beliefs that differ from their explicit ones (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) . Such implicit beliefs would not be revealed on explicit measures of the sort used in Study 3. Nevertheless, they could influence a variety of reactions to the stereotyped 2 We are not sure why the pattern of intercorrelations among items differed slightly from this study to the previous one. This may reflect differences in the stereotypic knowledge of the participant populations used in the two studies, differences in the salience of different aspects of the stereotype in the collective consciousness at different time points (the two studies were conducted more than a year apart), or other unknown sources of error. individual and may be detectable with more indirect, implicit measures (Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) .
Finally, it is possible that we failed to detect stereotype application by participants who showed stereotype activation in Study 3 because the lexical decision task that assessed stereotype activation in that study may have contaminated participants' subsequent target ratings. This task exposed participants to many stereotypic words. Comparable priming with stereotype-related words has been shown to activate stereotypes and to influence subsequent ratings of ambiguously described individuals (Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997) . Because Study 3 participants completed the lexical decision task just prior to encountering the ambiguously stereotypic target information, it is possible that even participants who had not activated the stereotype spontaneously while observing the target did activate it as a result of performing the lexical decision task. If participants in all conditions activated and used the stereotype while processing the ambiguous target information, it would be impossible to detect the unique impact of stereotype activation prompted by a disagreement with a Black individual on participants' subsequent impressions of this individual.
Thus, it remains plausible that people who activate a stereotype after disagreeing with a stereotyped individual do in fact apply this stereotype to this individual, despite Study 3's failure to detect such application. We examined this possibility again in Study 4, but this time we used an implicit measure of stereotype application. As well, we did not assess stereotype activation in this study so as to avoid inadvertently activating participants' stereotypes through this measure.
We wished to devise an indirect, implicit measure of stereotype application that could assess the extent to which participants' impressions of the Black individual were based on the Black stereotype without letting them realize that this was being measured (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) . Clearly, any questions that asked directly for judgments about the Black target could not serve as such an implicit measure, because participants would likely recognize that their responses might reveal prejudice and so might tailor their reactions to avoid the appearance of stereotype use. We realized, however, that people sometimes rely on their impressions of one individual to understand or predict the behavior of a second individual; therefore, it may be possible to infer participants' reactions to a Black individual from their judgments about a different, White individual. Using such logic, von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, and Vargas (1997) were able to infer participants' impressions of the dangerousness of a Black man who had requested money from a White man from the participants' judgments of the meekness of the White man who had acquiesced to that request (because the more dangerous the Black man seems, the less meek it seems for the White man to acquiesce to him).
We used a similar technique to infer the extent to which participants' impressions of the Black man who had agreed or disagreed with them were based on his ethnicity. We reasoned that if participants had explained the Black man's disagreement with them as stemming from his stereotype-based otherness, they would not use his reactions to the court case as a basis for inferring the reactions of a different, White man. People often rely on the behavior of a single individual to infer the behavior of other members of his or her social group, but such generalizations are blocked when the individual is viewed as belonging to an atypical subtype of that group (Kunda & Oleson, 1995 . Therefore, a disagreement that reminds participants that the Black individual belongs to an out-group may similarly block their generalization from him to members of their White in-group. Following this logic, we expected that participants who had just observed a White person disagree with them would generalize from this experience when predicting the reactions of a different White person but that participants who had just observed a Black person disagree with them would not; they would dismiss the reactions of the Black person as due to his ethnicity and would regard them as irrelevant to predicting the reactions of a White person. We modified the procedures of Studies 2 and 3 to explore this possibility.
As in Studies 2 and 3, participants playing the role of a juror discovered that they either agreed or disagreed about their verdicts with a videotaped fellow juror who was either Black or White (we refer to this juror as the known juror). In this study, all participants also viewed another brief video of a different, White juror who did not report his verdict (the unknown juror). Participants expected to deliberate the case with these fellow jurors and were asked about their anticipated compatibility with them. We expected that participants who had agreed or disagreed with a White juror would use this experience to generate expectations about their likely compatibility with the unknown juror, who was also White: Participants would anticipate less compatibility with the unknown juror after disagreeing than after agreeing with the White juror. However, we did not expect comparable generalization from participants who had observed the Black juror. If participants who had disagreed with a Black person used his ethnicity to explain his disagreement with them, they would view this disagreement as irrelevant to predicting their compatibility with a White person. If so, their expected compatibility with the unknown, White juror would be unaffected by whether they had agreed or disagreed with the Black juror.
Thus, participants' anticipated compatibility with the unknown White juror could serve as an implicit measure of their application of the Black stereotype to the known Black juror. We expected that this measure would be capable of tapping the extent to which participants viewed the known Black juror through stereotypic lenses, because participants would not be on guard to avoid prejudice when reporting their anticipated compatibility with a White individual (cf. von Hippel et al., 1997) . Moreover, this measure could also tap an unconscious dismissal of the relevance of the Black individual's reactions to predicting the reactions of White individuals.
A secondary aim of Study 4 was to rule out a possible alternative interpretation of our findings in Studies 1-3 that the Black stereotype was not activated following a lengthy exposure to a Black individual unless participants had discovered a disagreement with that individual. We argued that we obtained no stereotype activation in the lengthy exposure conditions in Study 1 and in the agreement conditions in Studies 2 and 3 because stereotypes that were activated upon initial exposure to a stereotyped individual had dissipated during the continued exposure, as participants shifted their attention to other aspects of the stereotyped individual or to the task at hand. It could be argued, however, that stereotype activation in these conditions dissipated simply because participants had lost interest in the boring videotape and essentially removed themselves psychologically from the situation until jolted by a surprising disagreement. If so, stereotypes would be unlikely to dissipate in real-life situations, in which such psychological disengagement seems far less likely. This interpretation would be weakened considerably if it could be shown that participants were indeed paying close attention to the contents of the videotaped interview. To assess attention to the video, we therefore added an unexpected memory test at the end of the study. Although we did not assess stereotype activation in this study, the videotapes of the known jurors and the context in which perceivers watched them were the same as in Studies 2 and 3. Therefore, strong recall in this study would imply that participants paid close attention to the videos used in the previous studies as well.
Method Participants
Participants were 64 male and female non-Black students enrolled in an introductory psychology class at the University of Waterloo who participated for course credit. One participant was excluded for failing to recall 9 of the 10 memory items (the remaining participants recalled 9.30 items, on average), 1 was excluded for misrecalling the known juror's verdict, and 1 was excluded for being an outlier (providing responses that were 3.50 standard deviations or more from the group means on the key dependent variables), leaving a total of 61 participants.
Procedure
As in Studies 2 and 3, participants first read about a court case and indicated their verdict. This time, participants were informed that they would view two videos depicting get-acquainted conversations with two different fellow jurors, one brief and the other more detailed. All participants first viewed the same 3-min video of a White man discussing mundane issues unrelated to the Black stereotype or to the court case. This juror did not provide any information about his verdict. We therefore refer to him as the unknown juror. Participants then viewed one of the four videotapes used in Studies 2 and 3; it depicted a Black or White man discussing mundane issues for about 12 min, at the end of which he indicated his verdict, which either agreed or disagreed with that of the participant. We refer to this juror as the known juror.
Expected compatibility ratings. Participants completed a questionnaire assessing their expected compatibility with the known juror, followed by a comparable questionnaire assessing their expected compatibility with the unknown juror. These questionnaires addressed the extent to which participants expected to feel comfortable with each juror, to experience conflict, and to ultimately reach a shared verdict as well as their similarity to each in opinions about the case, personalities, outlooks, goals, behaviors, and experiences and their overall similarity. Responses to these questions were made on 7-point scales with endpoints labeled 1 (not at all) and 7 (very).
Ratings of the known juror's attributes and likely behaviors. Participants then rated the known juror on 26 traits, of which 13 related to the Black stereotype. These included traits related to aggression and intelligence, as in Study 3, and to laziness (lazy, ambitious, hardworking). Ratings were made on 7-point scales with endpoints labeled 1 (not at all) and 7 (very). Participants then rated the likelihood that the known juror would engage in each of 26 behaviors. These included 13 related to the stereotypic attributes aggression (e.g., get into arguments with his friends frequently; shout at someone who frustrated him), academic success (e.g., graduate in top 10% of his class; drop out of university), and athleticism (e.g., play team sports in his spare time; play on a varsity sports team). Ratings were made on 7-point scales with endpoints labeled 1 (not at all likely) and 7 (very likely).
Memory test. Participants then completed an unexpected memory test about the contents of the interview with the known juror. It included 20 questions about whether the known juror had discussed a variety of issues, to which participants responded by checking "yes," "no," or "don't know." Half of the questions asked about topics that the target had mentioned (e.g., "Did he talk about public transportation?" "Did he talk about residence food?"), and half asked about similarly mundane topics that the target had not mentioned (e.g., "Did he talk about his major?" "Did he talk about his pets?"). To ensure that the mentioned topics represented the whole span of the videotaped interview, we divided the interview into 10 segments of approximately equal length and selected one topic from each segment. Participants were also asked about the known target's verdict, as a manipulation check.
Results and Discussion
Verdicts
Participants assigned to the guilty version of the embezzlement case viewed the accused as guilty (M ϭ 3.69), whereas those assigned to the not-guilty version viewed him as not guilty (M ϭ Ϫ3.16). A 2 (participant's verdict) ϫ 2 (target verdict) ϫ 2 (target race) ANOVA revealed that this effect of participants' assigned verdict was highly significant F(1, 53) ϭ 709.54, p Ͻ .0001. The main effect for target's verdict and the interactions did not approach significance, all ps Ͼ .30. Clearly, the manipulation of participants' verdict was highly effective.
For the remaining analyses, we collapsed the participants' verdict and the target's verdict into a single agreement variable, as in Studies 2 and 3, after first ascertaining, through 2 (target race) ϫ 2 (agreement) ϫ 2 (participant's verdict) ANOVAs, that the participants' verdict had no significant main effects or interactions.
Explicit Measures of Stereotype Application
We created three different indices to measure explicit stereotype application, each involving expectations about the known juror: Ratings of the known juror on stereotypic traits (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .81) and on stereotypic behaviors (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .77) and ratings of expected compatibility with the known juror (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .80; in each case, items connoting the opposite construct were first reversed). We subjected each measure to a 2 (target race) ϫ 2 (agreement) ANOVA. The means for these measures are presented in Table 1 .
Analyses of trait ratings and of behavioral predictions revealed no significant main effects or interactions, all ps Ͼ .20. Thus, as in Study 3, participants who had disagreed with the Black target did not rate the target as conforming more to the Black stereotype than did participants in any other condition.
Not surprisingly, participants who had disagreed with the known juror expected to have lower compatibility with this juror (M ϭ 3.73) than did participants who had agreed with him (M ϭ 4.83), F(1, 57) ϭ 25.95, p Ͻ .0001. As may be seen in Table 1 , this effect did not depend on the target's race; neither the main effect for race nor the interaction approached significance, both Fs Ͻ 1. The main effect for agreement obtained on this measure of participants' anticipated compatibility with the known juror is important in that it serves to validate the implicit measure, which was made up of identical judgments of anticipated compatibility with the unknown juror. Because participants' anticipated compatibility with the known juror varied meaningfully with their previ-ous experience of agreeing or disagreeing with that juror, it stands to reason that the measure of their anticipated compatibility with the unknown juror also tapped meaningful expectations on their part.
Implicit Measure of Stereotype Application
We averaged responses to items assessing participants' expected compatibility with the unknown juror into a single index of compatibility, after first reversing the item assessing expected conflict (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .79).
A 2 (target race) ϫ 2 (agreement) ANOVA on participants' expected compatibility with the known juror obtained no significant main effect, both Fs Ͻ 1, but revealed a significant interaction, F(1, 57) ϭ 4.93 p Ͻ .05, indicating, as expected, that the impact of participants' agreement with the known juror on their expected compatibility with the unknown juror depended on the known juror's race. As may be seen in Table 1 , participants who had disagreed with the White juror expected to have lower compatibility with the unknown juror than did participants who had agreed with the White juror, and this effect was marginally significant, F(1, 57) ϭ 3.17, p ϭ .08. In other words, these participants generalized from their experience with the known White juror when forming expectations about the unknown juror, who was also White. In contrast, participants who had disagreed with the Black juror showed, if anything, a nonsignificant tendency in the opposite direction ( p ϭ .18); these participants did not expect their interactions with an unknown White juror to mirror their experiences with a Black juror.
We expected that participants would think about the Black juror in stereotypic terms and dismiss his relevance for predicting the unknown White juror only after a disagreement with that Black juror, not after an agreement. This is because, on the basis of Studies 2 and 3, we expected that the stereotype would be activated only by participants who had disagreed with the Black juror, not by those who had agreed with him. Indeed, comparisons of participants' expected compatibility with the unknown juror revealed that participants interacting with the known Black juror differed significantly from participants interacting with the known White juror after a disagreement with the known juror, F(1, 57) ϭ 4.18, p Ͻ .05, but not after an agreement, p Ͼ .25.
We recognize that because our measure of implicit stereotyping is new, people may reasonably question its validity. As noted above, the validity of this measure, which is made up of participants' expected compatibility with the unknown juror, gains support from the demonstrated validity of the comparable measure of expected compatibility with the known juror. Clearly, participants are capable of expressing meaningful, experience-based expectations when responding to such measures. Nevertheless, we sought further validation of this measure. After we conducted the study, we realized that approximately half of our participants (N ϭ 29, distributed about equally among our four conditions) had completed a Canadian measure of Modern Racism (cf. several weeks before participating in the study, as part of a large mass-testing questionnaire. When we correlated this racism measure with participants' expected compatibility with the unknown juror within each condition, we obtained a strong positive correlation only in the Black disagree condition (r ϭ .76, p Ͻ .05, n ϭ 7); the more racist participants were, the more they expected to be compatible with a White juror after having just disagreed with a Black juror. No such correlation was found in any of the remaining conditions (all ps Ͼ .50) or when participants in the three remaining conditions were combined (r ϭ .01). Obviously, these results must be interpreted with great caution because they are based on very small samples. Further research is needed to examine how individual differences in racism relate to this and similar implicit measures of stereotype use (cf. Dovidio et al., 1997) . These suggestive findings imply that such research is well worth conducting.
In sum, whereas the implicit measure revealed that participants who had disagreed with the Black individual viewed him through the lenses of the Black stereotype, the explicit measures did not detect any stereotype application. It is difficult to tell whether participants who had disagreed with the Black juror refrained from applying the stereotype to their explicit judgments of this individual because they were unwilling to reveal that they were thinking of him in stereotypic terms or because they were unaware that they were doing so. Whatever the reason, it is clear that they were not as color blind as their responses to the explicit measures imply; their responses to the implicit measure suggest that their impressions of the Black individual were in fact informed by his ethnicity.
Memory
Overall recall for the contents of the interview with the known juror was very high. The memory test, which asked whether the juror had mentioned each of 20 topics, included 10 true items (for which the correct answer was "yes") and 10 false items (for which the correct answer was "no"). On average, participants answered 18.31 of these 20 questions correctly. The number of correct responses was the same in all conditions, with means for the four conditions ranging from 18.20 to 18.40, all Fs Ͻ 0.20. The average number of correct "yes" responses to the 10 true items was 9.30, and the average number of incorrect "yes" responses to the 10 false items (i.e., false alarms) was 0.61. To determine whether participants' attention had drifted away from the interview as it proceeded, we calculated separately the number of correct 
General Discussion
Our studies point to several novel conclusions about the dynamic time course of stereotype activation and raise many interesting questions. It is clear that stereotypes can be activated spontaneously as soon as one encounters a stereotyped individual, as shown in Study 1 and in several previous studies (Bargh et al., 1996; Fazio et al., 1995; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae et al., 1995) . But it is also clear that initially activated stereotypes may dissipate as the exposure to the stereotyped individual continues. We found in three studies (Studies 1-3) that participants who had been exposed to a Black individual for just over 10 min and who had not experienced any disagreement with this individual showed no evidence of stereotype activation. The stereotype, which was on perceivers' minds when they first encountered the Black individual, was no longer on their minds less than 15 min into the encounter. The stereotype did not dissipate simply because participants had lost interest in the observed interview and had let their attention drift elsewhere; Study 4 participants showed excellent memory for material presented throughout the interview, suggesting that they were paying close attention to the interview the whole time. It is more likely that, as the encounter with the stereotyped individual unfolded, participants shifted their attention from this individual's membership in a stereotyped group to other aspects of this individual or to the task at hand.
It also appears, however, that it does not take much for a stereotype that is no longer on one's mind to be resurrected. The discovery of even a relatively trivial disagreement with a stereotyped individual may suffice to bring the stereotype back to mind. We found in Studies 2 and 3 that participants who had been exposed to a Black individual for 12 min-long enough to allow for initially activated stereotypes to dissipate-nevertheless activated the Black stereotype if the Black individual disagreed with them on the appropriate verdict in a court case (but not if he agreed with them). Thus, events that transpire during an interaction with a stereotyped individual can prompt the reactivation of stereotypes that had already dissipated.
The Consequences of Stereotype Dissipation and Reactivation
The consequences of stereotype activation for how people view and interact with others who do not belong to the stereotyped group have been well documented. For example, it has been shown that people who have been primed to activate the Black stereotype view individuals not assumed to be Black as more aggressive (Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997) and behave more aggressively toward White individuals (Bargh et al., 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997) . Such consequences for the perception of nonstereotyped bystanders are important in their own right, and we expect that they will wax and wane as stereotype activation rises and fades during an interaction with a stereotyped individual.
The consequences of the dissipation and reemergence of stereotype activation for the perception of individuals who do belong to the stereotyped group are less obvious. We assume that once a stereotype has dissipated during an interaction with a stereotyped individual, it will no longer influence the perceiver's interpretation of that individual's ongoing behavior. Therefore, the perceiver's impression of the stereotyped individual will be less influenced by the stereotype. However, perceivers' impressions are not guaranteed to be free of any stereotypic influences once their stereotypes have receded, because initially activated stereotypes may sometimes exert an enduring impact on impressions that may persist long after the stereotype's activation has dissipated. An initial stereotypic impression, formed while the stereotype was still activated, may have long lasting consequences for how the stereotyped individual is perceived (for a review, see Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996) and may also influence how that individual reacts by becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy (Chen & Bargh, 1997; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974) . We found no evidence for such lasting stereotypic influences on the explicitly or implicitly reported impressions of participants who had agreed with the Black individual in our studies, but it remains possible that such influences may occur in other settings. It also remains possible that in live interaction, perceivers' initial, stereotype-based reactions prompt behavioral confirmation from the target, setting off a chain reaction that cannot unfold when perceivers only observe a video of a stereotyped individual, as did participants in our studies.
It is not obvious, though, how perceivers' impressions of a stereotyped individual are affected when the stereotype is initially activated or reactivated by disagreement. Researchers investigating the consequences of activating stereotypes through priming have often focused on consequences for the perception of nonstereotyped individuals because they wished to avoid activating the stereotype in nonprimed controls (cf. Chen & Bargh, 1997) and because they were concerned that participants would conceal their stereotype-driven reactions to stereotyped individuals because of their motivation to avoid prejudice (Fazio et al., 1995; Plant & Devine, 1998) . The handful of studies that did examine the impact of stereotype activation prompted by exposure to a stereotyped individual on perceivers' impressions of that individual found that participants applied their activated stereotype to the individual who had triggered its activation if they were cognitively busy while forming these impressions (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991) or if they were driven by self-enhancement motives that could be satisfied by stereotyping that individual . But participants who activated the stereotypes without also experiencing busyness or self-enhancement goals did not apply these activated stereotypes to the individual who had triggered their activation, much like participants in Study 3.
It was unclear from the earlier studies why nonbusy, disinterested participants who had activated stereotypes in reaction to a member of a stereotyped group failed to apply these activated stereotypes to that individual (cf. Gilbert & Hixon, 1991) . It is possible that, under such circumstances, people take the time and effort to form individuated impressions that are truly free of stereotyping even if the stereotype is on their minds. If so, perceivers who are cognitively busy or driven by self-enhancement show stereotype application because they replace such effortful processing with less effortful, stereotype-based judgment (Bodenhausen, 1990) . However, it is also possible that nonbusy, disinterested participants do in fact form stereotypic impressions, which they then inhibit because of their motivation to avoid prejudice. If so, it is this effortful inhibition that breaks down when participants are cognitively busy or driven to self-enhance, resulting in stereotype application.
Study 4 lends support to the latter possibility. Participants who had disagreed with a Black individual and who could therefore be assumed, on the basis of Studies 2 and 3, to have activated the Black stereotype did not show stereotype application when rating that individual on explicit measures, much like participants in the earlier studies. However, their responses to our implicit measure revealed that they had not formed truly stereotype-free impressions. Rather, their impressions of the Black individual were informed by his ethnicity: They were less likely to use this Black individual's disagreement with them as a basis for predicting the reactions of a different White individual than were participants who had experienced a comparable disagreement with a White individual. Thus, an activated stereotype can have real consequences for perceivers' impressions of members of the stereotyped group, but implicit measures may be needed to detect these consequences.
We note that our novel implicit measure, willingness to generalize from the target's behavior, does not permit us to assess the full extent of stereotype application. This measure revealed that participants dismissed the relevance of the Black individual to predicting White individuals, which indicates that they were thinking of him in terms of his membership in a non-White social category. Such category-based dismissal of the relevance of members of one social group for understanding and predicting members of other groups has important implications. For example, White perceivers may fail to learn from the successes and failures of non-White individuals because they deem these irrelevant to themselves. White individuals may also be reluctant to project their own attributes onto non-White individuals, thereby failing to appreciate their shared humanity (Dolderman & Kunda, 2001 ). Yet it remains unclear whether, in addition to thinking about the Black individual in terms of his membership in the social category of Black people, participants were also viewing him in terms of the stereotype associated with that category. That is, were they viewing him as especially aggressive or athletic?
Only a small number of implicit measures of stereotype application have been used to date, and most of these, like ours, could not answer this question. These implicit measures have included the distance that participants put between themselves and a stereotyped individual when choosing a seat & Jetten, 1994) , the pleasantness of behavior toward a stereotyped individual (Fazio et al., 1995) , the number of nervous nonverbal behaviors displayed by participants interacting with a stereotyped individual (Kawakami et al., 1998; Word et al., 1974) , the level of abstraction used in descriptions of a stereotyped individual's actions (Maass, Milesi, Zabbini, & Stahlberg, 1995; Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989) , and impressions of the meekness of a nonstereotyped individual observed interacting with a potentially dangerous stereotyped individual (von Hippel et al., 1997) . Only the last of these measures is capable of revealing the application of a specific stereotypic trait to a stereotyped individual, and the use of this measure is restricted to the narrow circumstances for which it was originally developed. The other measures assess general negative affect or attitudes toward the stereotyped individual rather than the application of more specific stereotypic attributes.
It remains a challenge to develop new implicit measures of stereotype application that can reveal the extent to which perceivers' impressions of a member of a stereotyped group are guided by the contents of that group's stereotype. We have shown that stereotypes activated by disagreement with a stereotyped individual can have consequences for perceivers' impressions of that individual, but until more sensitive measures of stereotype application are developed, we cannot tell the full range of these consequences.
The Determinants of Stereotype Dissipation
We found that stereotype activation can dissipate. But does it always dissipate? Does such dissipation depend on time alone, or does it also depend on how the stereotyped individual behaves during that time? Does it depend on perceivers' goals? In our studies, participants observed the stereotyped individual speaking continuously and so obtained a fair amount of individuating information about this individual. Did the stereotype dissipate because the individuating information shifted participants' attention away from the stereotype, as implied by the research of Locksley and her colleagues (Locksley et al., 1980 (Locksley et al., , 1982 ? Or did it dissipate simply because of the passage of time?
Another important question concerns the nature of the information learned about the stereotyped individual during the interaction. Although we attempted to provide information about the target that did not bear directly on the stereotype of Black people, it is all but impossible for a videotaped or audiotaped individual to convey only stereotype-irrelevant information. Inevitably, the person's demeanor and intonation are likely to be construed as indicative of his or her aggressiveness, and the person's vocabulary and fluency of speech are likely to be construed as indicative of his or her intelligence. It may be that our targets seemed counterstereotypic in that they were relatively well spoken and mild mannered. Would the stereotype also dissipate in the presence of a more stereotypic individual?
It is also interesting to ask whether stereotype dissipation depends on perceivers' goals. Do stereotypes dissipate if perceivers have the goal of evaluating or forming an impression of the target? Such goals were not explicitly present in our studies; in Study 1, perceivers observed the target with the aim of determining whether the observed interview would be useful for incoming students, and in the remaining studies, participants were given no explicit goal. Perceivers' goals have been shown to affect social information processing (Devine, Sedikides, & Fuhrman, 1989) and to influence the initial activation of some stereotypes (Pendry & Macrae, 1996) . They may also influence the time course of stereotype activation.
Stereotype dissipation may also depend on perceivers' prejudice and on their motivation to control it. Highly prejudiced individuals are especially likely to activate the Black stereotype when primed with relevant cues (Fazio et al., 1995; Kawakami et al., 1998; Lepore & Brown, 1997) . It would be interesting to determine whether they are also especially likely to keep their activated stereotypes activated throughout their interactions with Black individuals. Stereotype dissipation may result in part from the motivation to control prejudice. If so, stereotypes may be less likely to dissipate over time for perceivers whose motivation to control prejudice is driven primarily by external rather than internal sources (Plant & Devine, 1998 .
In short, activated stereotypes may not always dissipate with time. Further research is necessary to determine how the time course of stereotype activation is influenced by various aspects of the stereotyped individual, of the perceiver, and of the interaction between them.
The Determinants of Stereotype Reactivation
We have identified one factor-disagreement-that can prompt the reactivation of dissipated stereotypes. It will be interesting to further investigate why disagreement prompts stereotype reactivation and to identify additional factors that can do the same. Disagreement may provoke stereotype activation because it gives rise to comprehension goals that prompt a search for explanations (Wong & Weiner, 1981) . People may call on the otherness of a stereotyped person to explain this person's otherwise inexplicable position (Kunda et al., in press; Miller & Prentice, 1999) . If so, stereotype activation may also be prompted by any puzzling behavior by a member of an out-group and by any event that creates a need to understand or predict a stereotyped individual (Kunda et al., in press ). For example, students confronted with the need to predict another student's likely major may activate stereotypes that seem useful for that purpose (Hoshino-Browne & Kunda, 2000) .
Groups may also differ in the extent to which their essences are used to explain the behavior of group members. Some groups may be assumed to have greater unity, coherence, or entitativity than others (Brewer & Harasty, 1996; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996) . African Americans, for example, may be viewed as more likely to have a shared inherent essence than are Democrats. It may be that the discovery of a disagreement with a member of an out-group prompts the activation of that group's stereotype only if the group seems high in entitativity.
Disagreement may also prompt stereotype activation by provoking the motivation to disparage the person who has challenged one's worldview (cf. Spencer et al., 1998) . It may be that whenever one becomes motivated to disparage a stereotyped individual, dissipated stereotypes are reactivated. If so, stereotypes may be reactivated during an interaction with a stereotyped individual if one is criticized by this individual , if one embarks on a competition with this individual (Klein & Kunda; , or even if one experiences a personal failure that has nothing to do with the stereotyped individual (Spencer et al., 1998) .
In sum, we suspect that many events that transpire during an interaction with a stereotyped individual may trigger the reactivation of dissipated stereotypes. Such reactivation may be prompted by the behavior of the stereotyped individual as well as by events that influence the goals and intentions of this individual's interaction partner.
Conclusion
We have found that stereotypes can be activated spontaneously when one first encounters a stereotyped individual, can dissipate as the encounter continues, and can be reactivated by events that occur during the encounter. The dynamic time course of stereotype activation during interaction can depend on the interpersonal dynamics of the interaction. The behavior of the parties to the interaction and their fluctuating goals, attitudes, beliefs, and moods may all influence the extent to which stereotypes are on their minds at various points in the interaction. To fully understand how stereotypes are activated and used in real-life situations, it is therefore necessary to investigate stereotyping in the context of meaningful interpersonal situations. The many studies on stereotype activation that examined participants' automatic reactions to briefly seen stereotypic photographs or words have made extremely important contributions to the theoretical understanding of stereotype activation and to the development of methods for its assessment (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; Devine, 1989; Fazio et al., 1995; Kawakami et al., 1998; Lepore & Brown, 1997) . But in order to gain deeper understanding of when and how people call on stereotypes in the course of their daily lives, it is now time to take the insights and methods gained from such research and use them to investigate stereotyping in more realistic interpersonal settings. Our research, in which participants viewed lengthy videotapes of individuals engaging in meaningful discussion and expressing judgments that bore on participants' own points of view represents a step in that direction. However, the implications of this research for real-life interaction are limited by the fact that it did not investigate live interactions. We hope that future research will meet the challenge of creating methods for examining stereotype activation within even more realistic interpersonal interactions and of devising sensitive implicit measures of the consequences of such activation.
